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The same big players determine space law and space politics are deter-
mined as terrestrial geopolitics, and therefore in asking how to govern space, 
we have to take the current realities of international relations and international 
law into account. At the beginning of the space race, which was at the height 
of the Cold War, the two superpowers were the key influential players in de-
veloping the first instruments of space governance, namely the 1967 Outer 
Space Treaty (OST),1 and three of the four other core space treaties.2 To a 
lesser degree, European powers and other smaller influential States, such as 
Canada, were also involved in the treaty negotiations, in forming relevant UN 
General Assembly resolutions, and in the decision-making within the Com-
mittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). But typically, for the 
development of any new international legal or governance regime, the smaller 
players are left on the periphery to accept the new order that is put in place by 
the greater powers. This new order that they accept is also often to their det-
riment. In many ways it is very difficult for new entrants into the space sector 
to wield any great influence on developing norms, or on the sector as a 
whole—at least, this is the case for States. Today’s space race is equal parts 
commercial and political, and commercial players have a unique ability to 
disrupt the status quo. However, my comments here are limited to States as 
new entrants. 
How are new entrants interacting with the international space law regime 
inherited from the Cold War, and what kinds of new governance structures 
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U.N.T.S. 205, https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/outerspacetreat 
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might we need to deal with the increasing number and kinds of participants 
emerging in the space sector? I take a critical perspective, drawing on feminist 
legal theory and Third World Perspectives on International Law (TWAIL) to 
pose further questions: Who is exercising power over the development of new 
legal and governance norms in space and who is excluded from this? I argue 
that, because we are all so dependent on space for our contemporary existence, 
twenty-first century space governance needs to take into account more than 
solely the interests of just the biggest players. 
Not only are there more nations active in space, but there are more and 
more activities being conducted in space, including commercial and scientific. 
This might include universities facilitating students being able to learn how to 
design and launch very small satellites into a very low Earth orbit. It might 
also include big commercial players such as SpaceX and OneWeb, who are 
beginning to launch hundreds of satellites as part of “constellations” to pro-
vide Internet access all over the world.3 And it also includes military compe-
tition and contestation. Space has become more accessible and with this 
comes more challenges in terms of space traffic management, increase in de-
bris and risk of collision, allocation of the radio signals necessary for satellites 
to transmit their signals and the risk of interference, light pollution caused by 
satellite constellations in lower orbit, environmental damage from launches 
and re-entries, and unequal access for developing nations. These concerns are 
growing in recent times, but the 1967 OST already foresaw what competition 
could lead to in space, which is why Article I of the OST states that the ex-
ploration and use of outer space: 
[S]hall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all 
countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific 
development, and shall be the province of all mankind . . . . 
Outer space shall be free for exploration and use by all States 
without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and 
in accordance with international law. 
Furthermore, under Article VI of the OST, States are responsible for au-
thorizing and continually supervising all space activities that take place under 
their jurisdiction, whether they are government or commercial activities. And 
States are responsible for damages caused by those space activities under Ar-
ticles VI and VII of the OST and under the Liability Convention.4 It is, there-
fore, up to States to regulate space activities under their domestic law, but at 
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the same time, these are international global problems, and we need to come 
up with international legal and governance solutions as well. We need to think 
about our space environment the way that we think about our oceans and about 
natural world heritage areas, as a global commons. Space is part of our natural 
environment, upon which we’re very dependent. We cannot count on individ-
ual States, who operate according to their own interests, to regulate in the 
global interest. 
Given this global interest and participation in space, a broad definition 
should be given to what we mean by “new entrant.” Today there are only 
fourteen space-faring nations—that is, States that have independent launch 
capability from their own territory.5 New Zealand was a new addition in 2019, 
and in 2020 Australia will also join this list.6 However, there are at least 72 
countries which have space programs, and around 100 States own satellites.7 
There are approximately 2,000 operational satellites today, of which the 
United States owns nearly half, which is more than the combined total of the 
next top ten States.8 Almost all States receive some kind of satellite-based 
services, such as television broadcasting, phone and internet communications, 
navigation, precision timing for services such as banking, traffic, medical 
equipment, farming, weather and climate predictions, and much more. It may 
not be that all of these States can be considered “new entrants” since many of 
them are more likely consumers of the space economy rather than active par-
ticipants. But as more States are participating in and impacting upon the space 
sector, a broad definition should include all stakeholders in order to respond 
to the needs of space governance in the twenty-first century. 
The notion of “new entrant” States usually brings to mind countries such 
as Israel9 and India10 who have only taken a few years to develop a successful 
space program—and in the case of India, even to test an anti-satellite weapon 
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 6 Id. 
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-with-the-most-satellites-in-space/. 
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 9 About the Israel Space Agency, ISR. SPACE AGENCY (Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.spac 
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ORG., https://www.isro.gov.in/sites/default/files/flipping_book/Glimpses2018/index.html 
(last visited Feb. 20, 2020); 3 Things to Know About India’s Space Programme as Its Mis-
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/07/india-moon-landing/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2020). 
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in 2019, much to the chagrin of the current big players.11 New entrants may 
be seen as disrupting the political status quo, or challenging the legal grey 
areas in space law. However, some new entrants, such as Australia, are less 
disruptive yet highly innovative. The Australian Space Agency (ASA) was 
created in 2018 and only opened its physical headquarters on February 19, 
2020,12 with a mandate to support the growth of Australia’s space industry.13 
There is no national civil space program, rather the government is entirely 
focused on pouring money and resources into supporting Australian commer-
cial space entities. This is quite a different scenario from the U.S., where com-
mercial entities have historically had to compete with, or seek contracts 
through, NASA’s national space program. 
Additionally, some new entrants who are not typically challengers to the 
international legal or political order have been highly disruptive with small 
actions. In 2017, Luxembourg passed a law stating that it will provide licenses 
to companies registered in Luxembourg to extract and possess resources in 
outer space14—a law which appears to be in breach of the prohibition of ap-
propriation under Article II of the OST, and yet, because it has not been legally 
challenged, in fact invites companies from around the world to register in 
Luxembourg and boost that small country’s economy. The U.S. passed a sim-
ilar law in 2015,15 and both countries argue they are simply fulfilling their 
obligation under Article VI of the OST to “authorize and supervise” space 
activities.16 However, there is still debate as to whether both States’ legislation 
is in breach of the OST. In any case Luxembourg’s legislation goes further 
than the U.S.’s act, and the fact that such a small player may have impacted 
future interpretation of the OST took many by surprise. 
Space security expert Joan Johnson-Freese describes the tensions sur-
rounding space governance as a geo-strategic contest in space, particularly 
 
 11 All You Need to Know About Mission Shakti, BUSINESSLINE, https://www.thehindubus 
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ated Minimal Space Debris. Is That True?, SPACE.COM (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.space 
.com/india-anti-satellite-weapon-test-debris.html. 
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headquarters-open-in-adelaide/11978930. 
 13 AUSTL. GOV’T, AUSTRALIAN SPACE AGENCY CHARTER sec. 4 (2018), https://www.ind 
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 14 Loi du 20 juillet 2017 sur l’exploration et l’utilisation des ressources de 
l’espace [Law of 20 July 2017 on the Exploration and Use of Space Resources], Journal 
Officiel Du Grand-Duché De Luxembourg [Official Gazette of The Grand Duchy Of Lux-
embourg], No. 674 (July 28, 2017), http://data.legilux.public.lu/file/eli-etat-leg-loi-2017-0 
7-20-a674-jo-fr-pdf.pdf. 
 15 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015, H.R. Res. 2262, 114th 
Congress (2015), https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2262/text. 
 16 Id. 
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based on the competition between great powers.17 But this is not only due to 
traditional counter-weights such as Russia or China; it is the rapid rise of mul-
tiple new entrants which may be causing real challenges to traditional geo-
strategic positioning, and which forces us to think of new ways to resolve such 
issues. 
A noted above, the international space legal framework we have today is 
inherited from the height of the Cold War and was very much determined by 
the political climate of the time. But it must be remembered that this is always 
the case—and perhaps especially for international law. Political climates de-
termine both the law-making processes and the normative content of the law. 
Law presents itself as neutral, objective, rational, and universally applica-
ble. But as Hillary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin, and Shelley Wright wrote 
in their seminal 1991 article “Feminist Perspectives on International Law”: 
Western theories about the law say that the law is an autono-
mous entity, distinct from the society it regulates. A legal sys-
tem is regarded as different from a political or economic sys-
tem, because it operates on the basis of abstract rationality, and 
is thus universally applicable and capable of achieving neu-
trality and objectivity.18 
However, as the authors point out, we all know that some are more equal 
than others in the eyes of the law. And it is clear that laws are always the result 
of the political climate at a given time. For example, immigration laws in the 
U.S. changed dramatically in 2001, post-911, and they have changed again 
controversially in the last four years due directly to a specific political climate. 
Labor laws and equal opportunity laws were far weaker fifty years ago than 
they are today. Laws on slavery determined that black human beings were a 
commodity, with no rights, and could lawfully be bought and sold. Up until 
the 1960s, female human beings were considered to be children under the law. 
If we got married, we had to give up our jobs, couldn’t have bank accounts, 
and couldn’t sign contracts or own real estate. Law is ultimately a political 
event, it’s always the product of its time, and it’s always the product of those 
who have the power to determine the law. Law is never neutral, rather it’s 
always an expression of that power, and designed to maintain a certain status 
quo. 
Feminist legal methodologies are applied to unveil power, by asking two 
questions: who has power and who lacks it. In many ways, as a critical legal 
 
 17 Joan Johnson-Freese, The Next Race: The Geostrategic Contest in Space, 193 RSIS 
COMMENT. 1 (2019), https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/the-next-race-the-geostr 
ategic-contest-in-space/#.Xk3jKiN7k2w. 
 18 Hillary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin & Shelley Wright, Feminist Approaches to 
International Law, 85 AMERICAN J. OF INT’L L, 613–45 (1991). 
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tool, feminist methodologies are similar to TWAIL, which critique the ways 
in which international law has always been developed by the Western powers 
to maintain their power in the world order, often to the direct detriment of 
developing nations.19 An institution that both methodologies critique is the 
UN system, that was established post-World War II to maintain the world or-
der at that time, and in particular the five permanent members of the Security 
Council and their exclusive veto power. Despite cries for reform of the UN 
for many years now, any formal or procedural changes would require those 
five permanent members to agree to those changes, and not to exercise their 
veto, however it is extremely unlikely that all five of them would willingly 
give up their positions of power. 
If we apply a critical lens to international space law, we must ask who 
holds the power and who lacks it? As I’ve already noted, space politics are the 
same as terrestrial politics, in the sense that the biggest players are determin-
ing space governance: the U.S. first, the EU second, with a counterweight 
from China and Russia. But this status quo is starting to be an albatross around 
the neck of the very nations wishing to remain ahead in the commercial and 
political space race, and there are more opportunities for positive disruption 
as the number (and type) of entrants into the space sector continues to in-
crease. 
One example of the status quo is the fact that COPUOS has appeared dead-
locked for many years by the consensus process of decision-making. It was 
under the auspices of COPUOS that the five core space treaties were negoti-
ated and signed, and consensus decision-making made sense at the time, when 
there were fewer members. Over time, with more members, it has become 
more difficult to come to consensus on any issues, hence the lack of any new 
space treaties since the 1970s. Often commentators will point to this as evi-
dence that there is no international appetite for new treaties, however this rep-
resents only the view of certain influential players, namely the U.S. and its 
tethered allies: countries like Australia, Canada, much of the EU and the UK, 
all of whom are tethered for political and security reasons. When the U.S. 
takes a position, tethered allies will follow suit. For example, a vast majority 
of countries express a concern about the weaponization of outer space through 
annual UN General Assembly resolutions, and recently a UN Group of Gov-
ernment Experts (GGE) on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space 
was set up to discuss the possibility of a new treaty. 20 Many nations have also 
 
 19 JAMES THUO GATHII, THE AGENDA OF THIRD WORLD APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (TWAIL) (forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3304767 (last visited 
Apr. 6, 2020). 
 20 CD Documents Related to Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, UNITED 
NATIONS OFFICE AT GENEVA, https://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/D4C 
4FE00A7302FB2C12575E4002DED85?OpenDocument (last visited Aug. 29, 2019); 
Group of Governmental Experts on Further Effective Measures for the Prevention of an 
Arms Race in Outer Space, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS, https://w 
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made unilateral statements promising a No First Placement of weapons in 
outer space, and China and Russia have presented joint proposals for a Treaty 
on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space,21 but the U.S. 
continues to refuse to support such initiatives, and its tethered allies follow 
suit. This power structure played out explicitly at the recent GGE meeting in 
2019. There is no public documentation from that meeting yet available, but I 
attended an event on space security in which delegates from the U.S. Depart-
ment of State very openly, proudly stated that they had managed to blockade 
any further discussion on a possible treaty. 
Similarly, the attempt to negotiate a non-binding International Code of 
Conduct (ICoC) to agree on certain standards of responsible conduct in outer 
space has suffered from these power constructs. Originally an EU initiative, 
articles of the instrument dealt with mitigating or minimizing space debris, 
sharing of information and more transparency about who is doing what in 
space, and other commitments leading to a more secure and stable environ-
ment. From a TWAIL perspective, there was a positive influence on the part 
of developing nations, who critiqued the early process as being determined by 
an EU agenda. Between 2008 and 2014, the EU opened up that process and 
held round tables in various regions around the world to try and respond to 
their critique. By 2015 it seemed the ICoC had gained sufficient support, a 
meeting was hosted by the UN to try and reach agreement on the document. 
However, a majority of that meeting was spent discussing critiques of the pro-
cess, by nations still unhappy that once again, international governance was 
to be determined by a few big players, ignoring the interests of so many other 
stakeholders.22 In a glaring example of this very power structure, the U.S. 
shifted its earlier position of supporting the ICoC, to blocking it based on the 
objection that there the right to use force in self-defense in space was not sat-
isfactorily codified. As any international lawyer knows, a non-binding instru-
ment can never change anything about the right to use force in self-defense, 
which is guaranteed both by customary international law and by Article 51 of 
the UN Charter. That right also applies in space, not only because it is a cus-
tomary right under international law, but also because the OST states explic-
itly in Article III that any activity in space must be carried out in accordance 
with international law, “including the Charter of the United Nations.”23 The 
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 21 People’s Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Treaty on the Prevention of 
the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space 
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 23 U.N. Charter art. 3, para.1. 
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most influential player blockaded this international space governance initia-
tive for its own political reasons, and its tethered allies once again followed 
suit. 
When we ask the question who is excluded by these power structures in 
international space law, it is clear that in general, it is the new entrants as well 
as developing nations who may stand to benefit from the space economy and 
from long term sustainability of the space environment, even if they are not 
active participants. Even those new entrants which are tethered allies to the 
U.S., and which therefore benefit from U.S. protection, are not able to exercise 
any power over the international law-making and governance processes, due 
to their dependence on the U.S. 
In 1996, a large coalition of developing nations succeeded in having a res-
olution passed by the UN General Assembly, which is known as the “Space 
Benefits Declaration.” Its full title describes its intent: The Declaration on 
International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the 
Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular Account the 
Needs of Developing Countries refers to the articles of the OST which guar-
antee right of access to and benefit from space for all nations, and calls upon 
States more active in space to fulfill their obligations towards others less so. 
Its existence is a positive sign, however it has little normative weight as a 
General Assembly resolution and has had arguably little to no impact. 
Put simply, a critical perspective tells us that twenty-first century space 
governance needs to take into account more than the interests of the biggest 
players, especially in the face of space debris, regulating access to commer-
cially valuable orbital slots, safety for human space-flight, and reigning in or 
preventing weaponization. The question is, how? Taking a “stakeholder” ap-
proach to governance may help, as it allows, in theory, at least, for all stake-
holders to have some kind of voice in the creation and content of the rules that 
govern their behavior and the behavior of other stakeholders. 
New entrants need to be creating strong political blocs, and perhaps even 
moving forward to new agreements without the bigger players, if those bigger 
players are blockading or refusing to take part. If there are enough coalitions 
with agreements on responsible conduct and what this requires, eventually the 
bigger players will have to take part in order to participate in this increasing 
space economy. 
We also need to look more at non-binding government initiatives. For in-
stance, the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines that were agreed upon through 
an Inter-Agency committee, bringing together real experts from national 
space agencies, has been a relatively successful document that’s been inte-
grated into national regulations. More recently non-governmental, non-bind-
ing initiatives have started to appear, for example the Space Safety Coalition, 
consisting of over twenty organizations, whose voices as stakeholders have a 
potential to impact international safety standards where these are lacking in 
both international and domestic space law. 
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Also, we need to come up with solutions that build upon the successes of 
space governance to date, such as the inclusion of commercial entities in the 
decision-making structure of the International Telecommunications Union, 
which determines the allocation of frequencies needed by satellites for various 
purposes. We also need to see the OST itself as a success. I am in disagree-
ment with anyone who argues the need to renegotiate or update the OST. It is 
a framework treaty, which lays out general principles such as non-appropria-
tion, the prohibition on the placement of nuclear weapons, the principle of 
peaceful purposes, and the guarantee of access to and use of space for all. To 
date, all of these principles have been adhered to. The issues we face this cen-
tury require new and more detailed agreements, but that is not the task of a 
framework treaty. 
Finally, I am moved by the Botswanan notion of Ubuntu, which is an ex-
pression of justice, humanity, and compassion.24  Ubuntu is used to test any 
decision or law on the moral basis that an action is right in so far as it promotes 
a shared identity: “I am because we are, we are because I am.” This supersedes 
any power play, and takes into account the interests of all stakeholders, in-
cluding intergenerational ones: can future generations benefit if we behave in 
this way or make this rule, or are we impeding them? 
 
 
 24 NYOKO MUVANGUA & DRUCILLA CORNELL, UBUNTU AND THE LAW: AFRICAN IDEALS 
AND POSTAPARTHEID JURISPRUDENCE (2012); see generally Karen Smith, Contrived 
Boundaries, Kinship and Ubuntu: A (South) African View of “The International”, in 
THINKING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DIFFERENTLY (Arlene B. Tickner & David L. Blaney 
eds., 2013), https://www.taylorfrancis.com/. 
